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The Proposed OECD Multilateral Instrument 
Amending Tax Treaties
In this article, the authors consider some of the 
practical issues relating to the introduction of 
the OECD multilateral instrument amending tax 
treaties, which has been proposed within the 
context of the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting Project. 
1.  Introduction
The OECD has proposed a multilateral instrument (gen-
erally known as the MLI), which will modify as many of 
the world’ s tax treaties as states are willing to amend in 
consequence of the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting (BEPS) Project.1 The OECD consulted on the MLI 
but without releasing a draft of it on the basis that it was 
confidential and on a short timetable of one month.2 That 
the 33 responses only ran to 206 pages,3 which is short by 
OECD/G20 BEPS standards, probably reflects partly the 
short period and more significantly that the draft mainly 
covered the bare bones of some structural issues in draft-
ing the MLI and not much about the details of its content. 
Many of the responses called on the OECD to publish a 
draft of the MLI and to consult further on that draft. The 
indications at the consultation meeting on 7 July 2016 
were that the secretariat would take away this proposal 
and might well publish a draft. The writers of this article 
contributed to a response, and the article builds on that 
response without necessarily repeating all its points and 
adds some further points as a result of further discussions.
To illustrate what we mean when we say that the draft 
focused on the “bare bones” rather than the precise content 
of the MLI, it is very hard to comment when we do not 
know whether it will operate by either:
(1) modifying existing bilateral tax treaties4 by inserting 
the substantive provisions that have been developed 
during the OECD/G20 BEPS process. Having 
* The authors are writing in their personal capacity and not as represen-
tatives of any firms or institutions of which they are, or have been, 
members.
1. OECD, Action 15 Final Report – Developing a Multilateral Instrument to 
Modify Bilateral Tax Treaties (OECD 2015), International Organizations’ 
Documentation IBFD.
2. OECD, Public Discussion Draft, BEPS Action 15, Development of a Multilat-
eral Instrument to Implement the Tax Treaty related BEPS Measures, 31 May 
to 30 June 2016 (OECD 2016).
3. OECD, Comments received on Public Discussion Draft, BEPS Action 15, 
Development of a Multilateral Instrument to Implement the Tax Treaty 
related BEPS Measures, 30 June 2016 (OECD 2016).
4. We are mindful of the fact that there may be some multilateral tax treaties 
that would be modified by the MLI; for example, the Convention between 
the Nordic Countries for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to 
inserted those provisions, the MLI would, in a sense, 
then fall away, and attention in practice would focus 
exclusively on the existing bilateral tax treaties, now 
modified in their wording by the MLI; or
(2) modifying all bilateral tax treaties to which the 
parties to the MLI are parties (perhaps with a power 
to have exceptions) without specifying them indi-
vidually or stating which articles of a particular tax 
treaty are modified. It would be necessary to turn to 
the MLI for the wording of the modifying provision 
and to read the bilateral convention along with, and 
as modified by, the MLI. Thus, rather than seeking to 
delete and replace wording in existing bilateral con-
ventions, within the scope of matters covered by the 
MLI, one would turn from the bilateral convention 
to the MLI for the relevant wording. This approach 
would probably require provisions for the interaction 
of the MLI with particular tax treaties, such as that 
one could terminate a bilateral tax treaty without the 
consent of all the parties to the MLI.
This is an important distinction, particularly when one 
considers issues such as the Commentaries or Explana-
tory Statements to the new wording contained in the MLI, 
which we consider in section 2. It is also important as part 
of any future move towards multilateralization of the inter-
national tax rules or additional multilateral instruments. 
And it has relevance to the languages and implementation 
process issues, which we consider in section 3.
There are suggestions that approach (1) may be what the 
OECD has in mind. We favour approach (2) for the fol-
lowing reasons.
First, because approach (1) misses an opportunity to move 
towards common, internationally agreed wording on pro-
visions relating to double taxation.
Second, approach (1) may create inherent practical dif-
ficulties. Realistically, it requires consolidated versions of 
all existing bilateral tax treaties as modified by the MLI. 
To achieve these consolidated versions, it will be necessary 
to identify precisely the wording that is modified by the 
provisions in the MLI. That task is relatively easy where 
the bilateral convention is based upon the OECD Model5 
Taxes on Income and on Capital (unofficial translation) (23 Sept. 1996) (as 
amended through 2008), Treaties IBFD.
5. OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (26 July 2014), 
Models IBFD.
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or UN Model,6 but a far harder task where the wording 
departs from either of those Models. In practice, pairs of 
states may wish to agree in advance which provisions of 
their tax treaty are modified by the MLI (possibly by an 
exchange of notes to that effect), which loses some of the 
advantage of having a multilateral approach to this issue. 
We can see that there is a practical attraction in having 
consolidated versions of bilateral treaties, as amended by 
the MLI, rather than having to read each bilateral treaty 
side-by-side with the MLI.
Third, as explained in section 3., approach (1) also raises 
a practical issue over the Commentaries or Explanatory 
Statements to the wording contained in the provisions 
inserted by the MLI.
Fourth, approach (2) makes it easier to have different lan-
guage priorities from the treaty being amended.
However, approach (2), being novel, might make imple-
mentation procedures more difficult. Approach (1) is not, 
however, free of problems of implementation procedure in 
relation to languages and to the modification of multiple 
treaties at the same time.
We shall restrict our comments to three aspects: the status 
of the “commentaries” to the MLI (see section 2.); the lan-
guages issue (see section 3.); and implementation proce-
dures (see section 4.). The second and third are aspects 
on which the OECD did not formally consult but which 
may be important. We shall consider these on the basis 
of both the approaches. We recognize that there are pos-
sible variations on the approaches which may move them 
closer together in practice and that the reasons given for 
favouring approach (2) over approach (1) can, to some 
extent, be used to support both approaches, but we think 
that approach (2) is the better way forward.
2.  The Explanatory Statements to the MLI
There are two types of “commentary” to the MLI: the com-
mentary about how the MLI itself is intended to operate; 
and the commentary to the new language of the treaty pro-
visions amended by the MLI. We shall assume the exist-
ence of the former as an Explanatory Report appended to 
the MLI itself and explaining how it operates to modify 
existing treaties, hopefully with some clear examples. The 
following discussion is restricted to the latter.
As is well-known, the Commentaries to the OECD Model7 
are by their terms not legally binding, but are neverthe-
less extremely important. Courts around the world have 
struggled with their status and one can find examples of 
them deciding everything between their being ignored 
(now very uncommon), through to their being a supple-
mentary means of interpretation, to their being quasi-
context.8 Given the amount of effort the OECD puts into 
6. UN Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (1 Jan. 2011), Models 
IBFD.
7. OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Commentaries (26 
July 2014), Models IBFD.
8. There is, for example, a wide variation of approach taken in the courts of 
the countries represented by the members of the International Tax Group 
towards the OECD Model: Commentaries. In Australia, for example, the 
changing the OECD Commentaries, this is unfortunate. 
The problem arises because international law does not 
discuss explicitly the legal status of a commentary to a 
model which is then used as part of the basis for nego-
tiations to inform a bilateral tax treaty. It is different with 
a commentary to a multilateral treaty, and so here is the 
golden opportunity for the OECD to give a clear legal 
basis for the commentaries to the provisions inserted by 
the MLI. It is an opportunity that should be taken when 
the MLI is produced and can be approved by all the signa-
tories at the same time as signing it. Such an opportunity 
fits approach (2) more easily.
If instead approach (1) is adopted, the natural way forward 
would be for the OECD to wait until the MLI changes are 
incorporated into the OECD Model and then adopt the 
changes to the Commentaries on these provisions at the 
same time. That would be a missed opportunity. It would 
mean that the old pattern of amendment by Working 
Party (WP) 1 of the OECD would largely be followed, 
although probably the WP might be enhanced under the 
OECD’ s “Inclusive Framework”9 by the presence of associ-
ate member countries for this purpose. As everyone would 
be aware that such commentaries related to MLI provi-
sions as well as to the provisions of the OECD Model, it 
would likely be more difficult for OECD member coun-
tries and non-OECD countries to continue to express dif-
ferent views by publishing their observations or positions 
on the new commentaries.
courts have generally supported the use of the OECD Model: Commentar-
ies and, to the extent that the “ambulatory” issue is explicitly addressed, 
refer to the version at the time of conclusion of the tax treaty, but reading 
between the lines, the judges have taken divergent views as to the weight 
to be afforded the OECD Model: Commentaries. In Germany, the Bundesfi-
nanzhof (Federal Tax Court, BFH) has regularly stated that the OECD 
Model: Commentaries are not legally binding on German courts; however, 
OECD Model: Commentaries already existing when a tax treaty was 
concluded may be regarded as expressing an important opinion on how 
to interpret the OECD Model and identical bilateral German tax treaties 
(Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 32 (23 May 1969), Treaties 
IBFD). Dutch courts generally take a position quite similar to the German 
BFH. Similarly, in France, the Conseil d’Etat (Supreme Administrative 
Court, CE) has held that the OECD Model: Commentaries are to be used 
as a means of interpretation for tax treaties concluded between OECD 
member countries after they were released. Indian courts often rely on the 
OECD Model: Commentaries, provided that the language of the tax treaty 
is similar to the OECD Model. In Italy, some Corte Suprema di Cassazione 
(Supreme Court, CSC) decisions recognize expressly the relevance of the 
OECD Model: Commentaries, though only one isolated decision states it is 
binding. In Japan, the OECD Model: Commentaries are a widely accepted 
guide to the interpretation and application of provisions of bilateral tax 
treaties. Swedish courts also normally attribute great weight to the OECD 
Model: Commentaries. See, for example, the decision of the Regeringsrätten 
(Supreme Administrative Court, RG) in SE: RG, 2 Oct. 1996, RÅ 1996 ref. 
84, Tax Treaty Case Law IBFD. As recently as June 2016, the importance of 
changed OECD Model: Commentaries after the conclusion of a tax treaty 
impacted on the outcome of a case, so it is clear that the Swedish Högsta 
Förvaltningsdomstolen (Supreme Administrative Court, HF), within the 
framework given by articles 31 to 33 of the Vienna Convention (1969), 
finds the OECD Model: Commentaries important (see SE: HF, 20 June 2016, 
3960-14). In the United States, there is a line of cases that has referred to 
the OECD Model: Commentaries as a source of guidance. Similarly, in the 
United Kingdom, the courts have on a number of occasions referred to 
the OECD Model: Commentaries as an aid to interpretation, though the 
effect of subsequent changes to the OECD Model: Commentaries is less 
clear. The same is generally true in Canada.
9. OECD, First Meeting of the New Inclusive Framework to Tackle Base Erosion 
and Profit Shifting Marks a New Era in International Tax Co-operation, 30 
June 2016 (OECD 2016).
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In international law, commentaries – or Explanatory State-
ments as it would be better to call them to avoid any confu-
sion with the existing Commentaries – included with the 
MLI are “context” within the scope of article 31(2) of the 
Vienna Convention (1969):
The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall 
comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and an-
nexes:
(a)  any agreement relating to the treaty which was made be-
tween all the parties in connection with the conclusion of 
the treaty...10
This gives a definite legal status to Explanatory Statements 
complying with this definition. We presume that both tax-
payers and governments would welcome this and want it. 
It gives proper recognition to the work the OECD and G20 
countries who engaged in the OECD/G20 BEPS Project 
have put into making the Explanatory Statements.
In order for Explanatory Statements to achieve the status of 
context, it is essential that they are adopted by the parties 
at the time of the conclusion of the MLI. Since “conclu-
sion” is an expression of unclear meaning, in order to be 
safe, this means that states need to adopt the Explanatory 
Statements at the time of signing.11 While there is a pos-
sibility of a subsequent agreement having similar effect,12 
this would be much less satisfactory as agreement would 
in practice be harder to reach if there was no deadline and 
states could continue to discuss the detail. Therefore, as a 
practical matter it would be necessary for the Explanatory 
Statements to be agreed as part of the negotiation process 
for the MLI.
Such Statements, being context, have a status not much 
below that of the MLI itself, and its interpretative state-
ments will be followed by courts, except in the unlikely 
event that they contradict the ordinary meaning of the 
terms of the MLI or are contrary to good faith or the object 
and purpose of the MLI. As Gardiner (2015) says:
It is difficult, however, to find any practical examples where a clear 
indication of the parties’ agreement on interpretation has been 
outweighed by other interpretative considerations.13
One could achieve the highest status by referring to the 
Explanatory Statements in the MLI itself,14 or a slightly 
lower status as a Protocol of Signature by not cross-refer-
ring to them in the MLI,15 or a lower status still by stating 
10. For states adopting the MLI after its conclusion a similar status would 
be given by article 31(2) (b) of the Vienna Convention (1969), as “any 
instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the 
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument 
related to the treaty”.
11. R.K. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation 2nd edn., pp. 232-239 (Oxford U. Press 
2015).
12. Under article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention (1969).
13. Gardiner, supra n. 11, at p. 226. This statement is immediately after a 
quotation about subsequent agreements under article 31(3)(a) of the 
Vienna Convention (1969), but, if anything, the position of a contempo-
raneous agreement is even stronger.
14. As with the Protocol on the Interpretation of Article 69 of the European 
Patent Convention, which is listed as one of the associated instruments in 
article 164 of the Convention. See Gardiner, supra n. 11, at pp. 237-238.
15. Defined in a UN guide as “an instrument subsidiary to a treaty, and drawn 
up by the same parties. Such a Protocol deals with ancillary matters such as 
the interpretation of particular clauses of the treaty, those formal clauses 
not inserted into the treaty, or the regulation of technical matters …”. See 
Gardiner, supra n. 11, at pp. 87 and 238. For an example, see that relating 
that they were not legally binding.16 How these different 
levels of status might be reflected in the implementation 
by countries of the MLI would depend on their constitu-
tional law and legislative practice. The MLI or the Explan-
atory Statements as appropriate should spell out clearly 
what level of status is intended for the Explanatory State-
ments, and countries would then need to ensure that their 
implementation of the MLI achieved the intended level of 
status. Any of these different levels of status would be far 
preferable to the uncertain status of the Commentaries 
to the Model. It also fits better with approach (2) because 
the MLI provisions remain in being rather than ceasing to 
have effect when the amendments are incorporated into 
the tax treaties being amended, and so the Explanatory 
Statements also continue to have effect.
To take an example, we think it is particularly important 
that an Explanatory Statement on the proposed princi-
pal purpose test (PPT) is adopted and maintained by as 
wide a group of countries as possible. If, as seems likely, a 
large number of countries adopt the PPT, a single, agreed 
Explanatory Statement, with clear examples, adopted and 
applied by as wide a group of countries as possible could 
be the very best outcome in terms of providing useful guid-
ance and practical tools for taxpayers.
Another advantage of Explanatory Statements along these 
lines is that, if the draft commentaries contained in the 
OECD/G20 BEPS Final Reports are adopted as part of 
the MLI, they will clearly be adopted by a much larger 
number of countries than the smaller group of OECD 
member countries that formally adopt the Commentar-
ies to the OECD Model.
Of course, that means that the larger group will have to 
play a part in making future changes to them, but that is 
surely something that the OECD is encouraging, having 
interested a large number of states in joining the MLI. 
While, in theory, making changes might be more difficult, 
this should not be a problem if states can make observa-
tions if they do not agree (as they can with the Commen-
taries to the Model).
In summary, the OECD has the opportunity to either 
increase the status of the Explanatory Statements to the 
MLI by making them into context, which is an easier 
outcome to achieve under approach (2), or to maintain 
the status quo of Commentaries to the Model, which is 
the natural outcome of adopting approach (1). For the 
reasons given, we favour adopting approach (2) and giving 
the Explanatory Statements the legal status of context in 
terms of the Vienna Convention (1969).
to the Convention on the Contract for International Carriage of Goods 
by Road, considered by the UK Court of Appeal (CA), in UK: CA, 12 June 
1989, Chloride Industrial Batteries v. F & W Freight, [1989] 1 WLR 823.
16. As with the Explanatory Report to the Convention between the Member 
States of the Council of Europe and the Member Countries of the OECD on 
Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters (25 Jan. 1988), Treaties 
IBFD, which states that it “does not constitute an instrument providing 
an authoritative interpretation of the text of the Convention, although it 
may facilitate the understanding of the conventions provisions”.
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3.  The Languages Issue
Treaties in general have gone through two phases in rela-
tion to treaty languages. First, all tax treaties were uni-
lingual, initially in Latin (at least in Europe), and then in 
French, reflecting the clear benefits of a single language. 
The second phase was a move to multilingual treaties, 
reflecting that there was no obvious single successor to 
French as a universal treaty language. For example, the 
United Nations Charter (1945) and the Vienna Conven-
tion (1969) are in Chinese, English, French, Russian and 
Spanish, which are equally authentic. The Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (2007)17 is 
in 23 languages. Sometimes there is a prevailing text, as in 
the case of the Berne Copyright Convention, which started 
in French only in 1886 and is now in Arabic, German, 
Italian, Portuguese and Spanish, with power to designate 
further languages, but the French text still prevails. English 
speakers benefitted from this phase because nearly all trea-
ties had an English version. Even so, multilingual texts 
are clearly disadvantageous compared to the unilingual 
treaties seen in the first phase. Not only is there scope for 
mistakes,18 but some concepts do not translate and differ-
ent languages have different nuances of meaning.19
What may not have been generally appreciated, particu-
larly from the point of view of English-speaking coun-
tries, which normally20 make bilingual treaties with the 
treaty-partner’ s language (or languages)21 having equal 
authority,22 is that tax treaties have entered a third phase, 
which is reverting to the first phase but with English sub-
17. Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (2008/C115/01), OJ C 115 (2008), 
EU Law IBFD.
18. Convention between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands 
for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion 
art. 13(7) (26 Sept. 2008), Treaties IBFD says in English: “The provisions 
of paragraph 5 shall not affect the right of a Contracting State to levy 
according to its law a tax chargeable in respect of gains from the alienation 
of any property on a person who is, and has been at any time during the 
previous six fiscal years, a resident of that Contracting State …”. A literal 
translation of the Dutch text says “property of a person” (emphasis added). 
The English version, therefore, preserves a greater degree of charging than 
the Dutch.
19. As in Lord Wilberforce’ s analysis of whether “Averie” was used in its 
ordinary meaning or as a special meaning in maritime law in decision of 
the UK House of Lords (HL) in UK: HL, 10 July 1980, Fothergill v. Monarch 
Airlines [1981] AC 251, 274.
20. There are exceptions, such as the English-only tax treaties that have been 
concluded by the United States with, for example, Bangladesh, Belgium, 
Denmark, Sweden and Thailand, and the same for other English-speaking 
countries.
21. For instance, equally authentic versions of the Convention between 
the Government of the United States of America and the Government of 
the Kingdom of Morocco for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the 
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income (1 Aug. 1977), 
Treaties IBFD were agreed in French and Arabic as well as English. For 
constitutional reasons, Canadian tax treaties always include both English 
and French texts.
22. When effect is given to a treaty in the United Kingdom, only the English 
version is set out in the Statutory Instrument, but, as this states that the 
two language versions (which are reported to Parliament in the Treaty 
Series) have equal authority, there is no difficulty in a judge consulting 
the other language version. The situation is similar in the United States, 
where, even when multiple authentic versions are signed, only the English 
version is forwarded to the Senate as part of the ratification process. In 
Australia, treaties have, since 2011, been incorporated by reference rather 
than being set out which makes it even clearer that both language versions 
are incorporated.
stituted for French as the (if we may be pardoned for saying 
so) lingua franca of tax treaties. It has been estimated23 that 
in total over 80% of tax treaties have a version in English, 
whether the sole language version, one of the equally 
authentic versions or the prevailing version. The corres-
ponding total for French is less than 10%. Less than 10% of 
tax treaties use neither French nor English. The prepara-
tion of additional language versions of the MLI may not, 
therefore, be as significant an issue as the OECD makes 
it out to be.
Given this starting point, the OECD, who work in English 
and French, are well placed to propose an MLI in those 
languages only. But while tax treaties that do not use those 
languages may account for less than 10% of all tax treaties, 
they cannot be ignored, and the issue is what should be 
done for those treaties in relation to the MLI. There are two 
polar approaches: either to stick to the existing pattern of 
continuing with the original treaty languages for modifica-
tions made by the MLI, which fits better with approach (1), 
or for the OECD to give a nudge in the direction of either 
English or French only, which fits better with approach (2). 
Neither is an ideal solution. The former results in a multi-
tude of official language versions of the amendments made 
by the MLI, with the corresponding risks of differences 
in meaning, and the latter results in some modifications 
being made to a tax treaty in a language different from the 
rest of the treaty (although this is less obvious if approach 
(2) is adopted, as the MLI is a free-standing tax treaty).
There is also the middle way of using the original language 
(if not English or French) versions for the modifications 
made by the MLI, but insisting on the English or French 
version of those amendments prevailing in the event of a 
conflict. While a prevailing version of part of a tax treaty 
is probably unique,24 it would be important to ensure con-
sistency of interpretation and might be accepted in prefer-
ence to the two extremes.
The choice between the two extremes or the middle way is 
one for countries to decide, and we explore these without 
expressing a view in favour of one of them. It is interest-
ing to speculate on what the result would be if the OECD 
were to ask those countries who have concluded tax trea-
ties in neither English nor French how they would like 
to proceed? There are some pointers to the likely result 
being that they would want a reversion to the unilingual 
(but now with a choice of English or French) first phase 
of treaties to reflect the reality of the present situation. 
For example, about 25 of the approximately 100 Dutch 
tax treaties are in English only, as are a substantial number 
of Swedish tax treaties. One might feel that non-European 
23. R.X. Resch, The Interpretation of Plurilingual Tax Treaties, (forthcoming).
24. A possible example is that of Convention between Morocco and Italy for the 
Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income as Amended 
by the Additional Protocol (unofficial translation) (7 June 1972), Treaties 
IBFD, which was originally in Italian and French with equal authority. 
A first Protocol was made with the same language provisions. A second 
Protocol then added Arabic as a third treaty language, but with the French 
text prevailing. Nothing was said about the language provision of the first 
Protocol. It is arguable that since the first Protocol has its own language 
provision that was not altered by the second protocol without a specific 
reference to it.
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countries would think differently. But Japan, which suffers 
the disadvantage that none of the world’ s major, non-tax 
treaties is in Japanese and is therefore well used to the 
problem of treaties not being in Japanese, has concluded 
23 tax treaties with non-native English-speaking coun-
tries in English only,25 with a further two with a prevail-
ing English version,26 20 treaties where English is one of the 
treaty languages,27 and one where French was one of the 
treaty languages. So it seems clear how Japan would vote.
To the extent that there are countries left after eliminat-
ing all countries that would accept English and French as 
the sole language(s) of the MLI and of the treaty amend-
ments that this occasioned, then no doubt a special case 
could be made for them. For example, we understand that 
the Germany-Netherlands Income Tax Treaty (2012)28 was 
negotiated in English, but that text was not published, and 
the authentic treaty languages were Dutch and German, 
which was clearly at Germany’ s request as all German tax 
treaties are in German (even though another – third – 
language may be the prevailing language29 and they could 
have agreed to the English text as the prevailing text). Pre-
sumably, the Dutch would not mind if that tax treaty were 
amended in English, whether solely or as a prevailing text, 
but Germany might well have a problem.30 We doubt that 
this is a unique example.
If one wanted to preserve the approach of authentic texts 
in each treaty partner’ s language, there is a well-recognized 
25. Those tax treaties concluded by Japan with Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, 
Brunei, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, Hungary, 
Indonesia, Israel, Kazakhstan, Luxembourg, Malaysia, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Pakistan, Romania, South Korea, Sweden, Thailand and Turkey.
26. Agreement between the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administra-
tive Region of the People’ s Republic of China and the Government of Japan 
for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion 
with Respect to Taxes on Income (9 Nov. 2010) (as amended through 2014), 
Treaties IBFD; and Convention between the Government of Japan and 
the Government of the Republic of India for the Avoidance of Double 
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on 
Income (7 Mar. 1989) (as amended through 2006), Treaties IBFD.
27. Those tax treaties concluded by Japan with the following native English 
speaking countries: Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the 
United States and Zambia, and with the following non-native English-
speaking countries: Brazil, China (People’ s Rep.), Germany, Italy, 
Kuwait, Mexico, Oman, Poland, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Spain, 
Switzerland, the United Arab Emirates, the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics and Vietnam.
28. Convention between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Kingdom of 
the Netherlands for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of 
Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income (unofficial translation) (12 
Apr. 2012), Treaties IBFD.
29. The third (English) language only prevails “[i]n the case there is any 
divergence of interpretation between the German and the [other 
Contracting State’ s language] texts”. See, for example, Agreement between 
Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany for the Elimination of Double 
Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income and to Certain Other Taxes and 
the Prevention of Tax Evasion and Avoidance (17 Dec. 2015), Treaties IBFD.
30. DE: Grundgesetz (German Constitution) does not expressly prescribe that 
all formal laws need to be in the German language. However, it seems to be 
common opinion that only laws in the German language are apt to meet 
the (constitutional) requirement that all citizens can understand the law. 
Also, the language of parliamentary debate is German. Different from 
multilateral conventions, bilateral conventions are always concluded at 
least in the German language (see DE: Standardformulierungen für deutsche 
Vertragstexte (Terminological Series issued by the Foreign Office of the 
Federal Republic of Germany) 4th edn., vol. 4, p. 2 (2004)). It seems 
unclear whether such a bilateral convention could be amended by a 
multilateral treaty without a German version (irrespective of the existence 
of a German translation which is not an authentic text).
method in multilateral treaties for the existing treaty lan-
guage versions of the amendment to be prepared and sub-
mitted to the depository of the MLI for confirmation of 
its accuracy.
The middle way of requiring an English or French pre-
vailing text of the modifications made by the MLI might 
be attractive, however unusual it would be to have a pre-
vailing version of part of a tax treaty, as the price to ensure 
consistency of interpretation. But if there is a prevailing 
text of the changes made by the MLI, does one really need 
the original treaty language versions as well? It has pre-
sumably never happened, but would it be impossible for 
some provisions of a tax treaty to be in a language differ-
ent from the rest?31 And if that happened would that not 
be an encouragement to the countries to put the rest of 
the tax treaty into English or French? If the countries then 
wished to make English or French a prevailing text of the 
whole tax treaty, they could easily do so taking the OECD 
Model and making the necessary changes.
If the OECD were to produce the MLI and its Explanatory 
Statements in English and French versions that are equally 
authoritative, which might be the natural way to proceed, 
this would have a disadvantage because it would introduce 
a French official version of a modification to a tax treaty 
that was only in English, which would have to be consid-
ered in case there was a divergence of meaning (and simi-
larly for a tax treaty only in French). A subtler approach is 
called for if they decided to nudge tax treaties in favour of 
either English or French.
A possible way of avoiding the problem caused by intro-
ducing an equally authoritative French version into a tax 
treaty in English only (and vice versa), with the MLI and its 
Explanatory Statements being in both English and French, 
might be for it to provide that states could adopt the mod-
ifications to existing tax treaties and the Explanatory 
Statements either in English only, or French only, or both 
(which Canada would adopt for constitutional reasons) 
in which case both versions would have equal authority. 
Regardless of which version a state adopted, the English 
version would apply to modify a treaty solely in English or 
with a prevailing English text (and similarly with French). 
If the tax treaty being modified is between two states that 
have adopted the English version, that version of the modi-
fications and Explanatory Statements would apply. If the 
tax treaty being modified is between two states that have 
adopted different versions, both versions would apply and 
be equally authoritative (this would automatically apply in 
Canada). However, states could, when signing the MLI, 
agree to use a different one of those languages in relation to 
a particular tax treaty, so that two countries both adopting 
the English version could modify a treaty in two Romance 
languages in French.
Adopting approach (2) means that, if the operative parts of 
the modification to a tax treaty remain as part of the MLI, 
it is, or at least seems to be, less of a problem if these are in 
a language different from the rest of the tax treaty. Another 
31. But see supra n. 24 for analogous uses.
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advantage of this approach is that if the MLI remains in 
place it will be difficult for the parties to a particular tax 
treaty to avoid its provisions by making a new tax treaty 
between them or by amending the existing tax treaty in 
such a way as to achieve a different result if it is intended 
to prevent this. And they might also agree to use their 
best endeavours to achieve the same language position in 
relation to the MLI provisions in a treaty with a country 
that has not signed the MLI. This suggestion may sound 
extreme, but if the choice were put to countries it is pos-
sible that they might accept the use of either English or 
French as they wish (or both for Canada) as the only lan-
guages for the MLI changes in recognition that over 90 per 
cent of tax treaties use those languages. Then native Eng-
lish-speaking or native French-speaking countries would 
then no longer feel diffident about asking for the English 
or French to be the sole or the prevailing text; they are 
rapidly becoming the only countries who do not do this.
4.  Implementation Procedures and the MLI
The novel features of the MLI raise several issues on imple-
mentation procedure, although fewer if approach (1) is 
adopted.
The first issue relates to the MLI being in English and 
French only. Fortunately, many countries already have con-
siderable experience both with multilateral treaties and tax 
treaties which do not have a version in the national lan-
guage. As mentioned in section 3., about 25 of the approxi-
mately 100 Dutch tax treaties are in English only, and Japan 
has made 23 tax treaties with non-native English-speaking 
countries in English only, so their treaty partners must have 
dealt with the issue of tax treaties not in the national lan-
guage as well. Normally, an unofficial translation of a tax 
treaty into their own language is made for the information 
of the national legislature, while approving the tax treaty 
in an official language version.32 This has arisen in rela-
tion to both multilateral treaties and tax treaties in Italy,33 
32. Such an unofficial version has no legal authority unless it is authenti-
cated by the treaty partner, which it will not be. See article 33(2) Vienna 
Convention (1969).
33. Normally the ratification law approves an official version of a tax treaty, 
often the French version, but most recently the English version, and an 
Italian unofficial version is made for the parliament, which is attached 
to the ratification law sometimes without any express reference being 
made to it. As to tax treaties which are concluded in authentic languages 
other than Italian the ratification law provides for an Italian unofficial 
translation, as was the case with the following tax treaties: Convention 
between the Republic of Italy and the Arab Republic of Egypt for the Avoidance 
of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income and the Prevention 
of Fiscal Evasion (7 May 1979), Treaties IBFD; Convention between the 
Government of the Hellenic Republic and the Government of the Republic of 
Italy for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income 
and on Capital and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion (3 Sept. 1987), Treaties 
IBFD; and Convention between the Italian Republic and the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to 
Taxes on Income and on Capital (24 Feb. 1982), Treaties IBFD, which is now 
applicable to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, and Montenegro. Convention 
between Italy and Greece for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect 
to Succession Duties (unofficial translation) (13 Feb. 1964), Treaties IBFD 
does not have any unofficial translation attached.
Japan,34 the Netherlands,35 Sweden36 and Switzerland,37 
and, in Germany, for multilateral treaties but not bilateral 
tax treaties which have been made only in languages that 
include German (although German need not be the pre-
vailing language).38 English-speaking or French-speak-
ing countries have not had to deal recently with trea-
ties, whether tax or non-tax, in other languages because 
modern treaties will have an official English or French 
version as one of the versions, although, for non-tax trea-
ties, another language version may be the prevailing ver-
sion.39 But the same issue used to arise with multilateral 
treaties.40
34. As mentioned in section 3., Japan regularly concludes tax treaties in 
English only, and a Japanese translation is prepared for the Diet. Also, 
when a tax treaty is promulgated in the Official Gazette after it is approved 
by the Diet, the Japanese translation is published together with one of 
the authentic languages (English, if it is among them) of the tax treaty. 
However, the Japanese translation does not have a binding effect on 
the court. It is the authentic language(s) that must be interpreted by the 
court when there is a difference between the authentic language(s) and 
the Japanese translation.
35. As mentioned in section 3., about 25% of Dutch tax treaties are in English 
only with an unofficial Dutch version being prepared for the parliament.
36. Multilateral treaties without a Swedish version are implemented 
in legislation, Sweden being a dualist country, in one of the official 
languages with an unofficial Swedish version attached. For example, the 
Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters (1988) was 
implemented into Swedish law in the two official languages, French and 
English with an unofficial Swedish version attached. If a tax treaty is not in 
Swedish, for example, the tax treaties concluded by Sweden with Australia, 
Malta, the United Kingdom and the United States, the English version is 
implemented with an unofficial Swedish version attached.
37. All tax treaties are produced in French, German and Italian, but one or 
more of these can be unofficial translations. Tax treaties may be authenti-
cated in one or several languages: German or French is often the authenti-
cated language. With regard to Convention between the Government of 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Swiss 
Confederation for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes 
on Income (8 Dec. 1977) (as amended through 2012), Treaties IBFD, 
French was initially used as the authenticated language. However, for 
the exchange of notes of 3 and 6 May 2012, English was solely used as 
the authenticated language, compared to the Protocol (2009) for which 
French was used as an authenticated language. If the MLI were in English 
and French, French would be used as the official language with unofficial 
translations prepared in German and Italian.
38. A German version is the basis for parliamentary debates. In addition, it 
seems to be common opinion in Germany that any law when published 
needs to be either in German or accompanied by a translation (see DE: 
Handbuch der Rechtsförmlichkeit (Federal Ministry of Justice), Bundesan-
zeiger (Federal Gazette) 60 (2008), No. 160a, m.no. 79, 223 and Anhang 
1.6.). However, the translation does not seem to have any legally binding 
effect. Bilateral conventions (which always include the German language) 
are published in all of their languages except for “uncommon symbols”. 
Multilateral conventions without a German version (for example, the 
Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters (1988), 
Federal Law Gazette (BGBl.) II 2015, 966) are published in German in 
a translation made by the government, which need not be an authentic 
text, and in English and/or French; further languages are published 
only in exceptional situations. Although the parliament would accept 
the MLI in English and French with a German translation prepared by 
the government which was not an authentic text, it seems questionable 
whether the same would apply to amendments to bilateral treaties made 
by the MLI (see supra n. 30).
39. In India, English continues to be the language for official purposes under 
IN: Official Languages Act (1963). Legislation in English is recognized as 
the authoritative text under IN: Constitution, art. 348 notwithstanding 
that, under article 343, Hindi is the official language. Normally tax treaties 
will be in English and Hindi (in addition to the language required by the 
other state).
40. In the United States, an 1830 treaty with the Ottoman Empire was officially 
in Turkish. A 1796 treaty with Tripoli was in Arabic and then translated 
into an English version, which was ratified in the United States. The United 
Kingdom originally gave effect to the Warsaw Convention on interna-
tional carriage of goods by air, which was originally in French only with 
an English translation not even referring to the French in UK: Carriage by 
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The second issue relates to the MLI being in English and 
French but making modifications only in those languages 
to tax treaties in other languages, including the national 
language if that is not English or French. As before, 
national legislatures are likely to require a national lan-
guage version of the modifications, which will be part of 
the MLI, and which need not be an authentic text, although 
Germany would presumably insist on an authentic text of 
all German tax treaties being amended.41 Under approach 
(1) there would be a need to agree the treaty language ver-
sions of each tax treaty being modified, which could be a 
matter for the contracting states or could be handled by the 
depository of the MLI who would confirm their accuracy.
If approach (2) were adopted, with the MLI in English 
and French and making modifications in those languages 
only (or with English or French as the prevailing text) to 
tax treaties in other languages, one is in unknown terri-
tory when dealing with a bilateral treaty. However, han-
dling a multilateral treaty not in the national language is 
not unusual and, hence, handling the MLI in that fashion 
should not be a problem. Making modification to treaties 
in languages other than the treaty language(s) is unusual 
Air Act (1932). Only later when, as a result of a protocol, the Convention 
was also in English and Spanish, with the French prevailing, this resulted 
in the 1961 Act with the treaty scheduled in English and (the prevailing) 
French, which was the one in issue in the important treaty interpretation 
case of Fothergill v. Monarch Airlines (1980).
41. See supra n. 30 and the text immediately before.
but is mainly a language problem, which we considered 
in section 3., rather than a problem of implementation 
procedures (but Germany might well have a problem if a 
German tax treaty were modified in a language other than 
German, even though there seems to be no constitutional 
objection to this).42
The fact that the MLI would amend a number of tax trea-
ties at the same time does not appear to be a problem in 
any of the countries considered.
Another potential problem for legislatures is how to deal 
with countries joining the MLI in the future. Presumably 
the answer is that the national legislature would approve 
the MLI as it stood at a given time amending the tax trea-
ties that it applied to then. If later another country joined 
the MLI, this could be represented to the legislature for 
approval of the further amendments. This issue may not 
arise as the OECD is arranging a signing session in the 
first half of 201743 and, with the eyes of the world’ s press 
upon them, it may be likely that countries will not want to 
be seen to be missing.
42. See supra n. 30 and the text immediately before.
43. OECD, Secretary-General, Report to G20 Finance Ministers, Chengdu, 
People’ s Republic of China 23-24 July 2016 p. 9, last paragraph (OECD 
2016), available at www.oecd.org/tax/oecd-secretary-general-tax-report-
g20-finance-ministers-july-2016.pdf.
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